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1. Introduction 
This paper is the outcome of a workshop held on 9
th
 September, 2001, at the 
University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic, as part of the 6
th
 European 
Conference on Artificial Life. Entitled „The View from Elsewhere: Perspectives on 
ALife Modelling‟, the event was organised by four of the present authors (Bullock, Di 
Paolo, Noble, and Wheeler). Its aim was to review and discuss artificial life (ALife) 
as it is depicted in, and as it interfaces with, adjacent disciplines. If, as many ALifers 
hope, ALife is to interface successfully with biology, philosophy, linguistics, 
economics, and other fields of scientific enquiry, it is important to consider the 
opinions and attitudes of practitioners from these disciplines. What can we learn from 
their conceptions and misconceptions? What lessons are there to be learned from 
ALife research of a genuinely interdisciplinary character, and from the history of 
interdisciplinary research into adaptive systems? How can we improve the ability of 
ALife to “cross over”?  
The workshop was divided into five hour-long sessions.  Each of the first three 
sessions addressed a different ALife-related interdisciplinary interface. In the context 
of the issues targeted by the workshop, the various speakers either (a) examined 
bodies of research (often their own) located at the specific interdisciplinary interface 
in question, or (b) presented critical reactions to writings on ALife authored by 
researchers who are interested in A-Life, but who work primarily in the targeted 
adjacent discipline, or (c) both. The interfaces chosen for investigation were those 
with philosophy, biology, and linguistics. The fourth session of the workshop shifted 
the focus somewhat, in that it concentrated on a particular historical experience of 
cross-disciplinary understanding and misunderstanding, one which is close to the 
hearts of many ALifers, namely cybernetics. The first four sessions allowed plenty of 
time for constructive discussion and debate, but to ensure that there was a proper 
opportunity for participants to collectively investigate the issues, the fifth and final 
session was reserved for open discussion. 
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The main body of this paper is organised as follows: Each of the four main 
speakers at the workshop (Bedau, Bullock, Noble, and Husbands) and each of the four 
discussants (Wheeler, Seth, Kirby, and Di Paolo) has contributed a summary of what 
he considers to have been the main points of his presentation, typically written so as 
to take into account aspects of the discussions that followed. Each of these summaries 
appears as a distinct subsection of sections 2-5 inclusive. The title of each of these 
subsections is the name of the author concerned. These eight contributions are 
followed by a „Reactions‟ section in which certain themes from the various 
discussions are described.  It is important to note that this paper does not have a single 
voice, but rather many voices. Indeed, the word „perspectives‟ in the title is 
deliberately ambiguous. It signals not only the various perspectives on ALife adopted 
by researchers from other disciplines, as targeted by the workshop, but also the often 
differing perspectives on ALife adopted by the eight authors of this report. 
 
2. The View From Philosophy 
 
2.1 Mark Bedau 
 
I think philosophy and ALife are natural partners. Neither enterprise is monolithic; 
each is diverse and continually evolving.  Nevertheless, both share an interest in 
relatively abstract essences over contingent details, and  so-called “thought 
experiments” figure centrally in both.  (Philosophers conduct the experiments in their 
armchairs while computer simulations are used in ALife; see Bedau 1998.) So it is no 
surprise that combining expertise from philosophy and ALife enables us to make new 
progress on a number of central issues in both fields, such as emergence, 
adaptationism, evolutionary directionality, and whether ALife simulations can 
literally be alive (see, e.g., Bedau, forthcoming).  Here I will focus on another issue –
the nature of life – because it figures centrally in Kim Sterelny's recent critique of 
ALife (Sterelny 1997, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) and it highlights how philosophy 
and ALife are connected. 
 
Sterelny (1997) is struck by A-Life's resuscitation of “a quaintly old-fashioned 
project: defining life” (p. 587). When he asks “why suppose biology needs a 
definition of life?” (p. 587), he could just as well ask the same question about 
philosophy, for contemporary discussions of life are virtually absent from both 
disciplines. But I think Sterelny misconstrues the contemporary interest in life.  First, 
contrary to what Sterelny suggests, the central concern is not to analyse our concept 
of life. This concept is an historical artifact, which varies across different cultures and 
which changes as our beliefs and preconceptions evolve.  This concept might be an 
appropriate subject for anthropologists to study, but not natural scientists or 
philosophers. 
 
The question about life that interests scientists (and philosophers) concerns the 
natural world, not our concepts. Living systems have a variety of hallmarks, such as 
having an enormously complex and adaptive organization at all levels, and being 
composed of a chemically unique set of macromolecules. It's widely recognized that 
these hallmarks do not constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for life, but they 
still raise an interesting question: Why are those hallmarks characteristically present 
together in nature? That is, why do the phenomena underlying life give rise to those 
hallmarks and not others? This is a question about how best to understand a 
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fundamental feature of the natural world. Analysing our existing concepts will not 
yield the answer.  In fact, the answer may well require creating new concepts. 
 
The combined efforts of ALife and philosophy are well suited to attack this 
question. Philosophy offers the benefit of two thousand years of experience in 
examining and clarifying very abstract hypotheses about the most fundamental 
aspects of nature (existence, causation, mind, etc.).  One contribution of ALife is to 
push the boundaries of what life-like systems can actually exist. But more important, 
ALife systems provide one of the few feasible ways to explore unifying principles 
that might explain the hallmarks of life. 
 
It is still an open question whether we will find any such unifying principles 
or, indeed, whether any exist.  Sterelny doubts whether ALife will shed any light on 
the general nature of life. He is surely right that the abstractness of ALife systems 
makes it difficult to connect their behaviour to the behaviour of natural living 
systems. On the other hand, how can we clarify and evaluate candidate explanations 
of life's hallmarks without computer simulations? Purely verbal theories often sound 
plausible before one tries to make them concrete enough to simulate, and the 
behaviour of complex adaptive systems is notoriously hard to predict except through 
extensive simulations. 
 
Computer simulations are foreign to philosophical methodology today, but I 
think this will change in the near future. Thought experiments involving complex 
phenomena like emergence and the creative potential of evolving systems are too 
difficult to analyse from the armchair, but we now are able to study them with 
computer simulations.  This new methodology enables us to pursue issues that are 
ignored today, such as the ultimate nature of life. Some people want to show how 
ALife work helps answer the questions currently pursued in other disciplines. I want 
to make a different point: partnership with ALife can enable philosophy (and other 
disciplines) to pursue new fruitful research directions.  It is always controversial to 
propose changing the questions a discipline addresses. Nevertheless, I think we 
should embrace this controversy, since the possible fruits are so attractive. 
 
2.2 Michael Wheeler 
 
When philosophers look at A-Life, what do they see? Dennett (1994) offers two 
possible answers: 
 
1. ALife as a philosophical method. 
2. ALife as an object for philosophical study. 
 
Dennett sanctions both options, but favours the first. I think his positive argument for 
the first option is problematic. Here‟s why. 
 
Dennett‟s argument rests on the claim that ALife models (simulations and 
robots) are “prosthetically controlled thought experiments” (p.291). The idea is that 
while ALife models are realised as computers and robots, they retain the status of 
thought experiments, in that they are “arguments about what is possible, necessary 
and impossible under various assumptions” (p.291; cf. Bedau 1998, and in section 2.1 
above). The argument is completed by the claim that thought experiments are a 
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distinctively philosophical tool. Let‟s start with that latter claim. It seems 
straightforwardly false: thought experiments are a recognized tool of science too (e.g. 
Galileo‟s falling bodies, Einstein‟s train). And notice that this gap wouldn‟t be 
bridged by the additional point that ALife gains its philosophical credentials by 
addressing questions of philosophical interest. Science and the arts routinely tackle 
such questions, without thereby turning into sub-disciplines of  philosophy. 
 
In any case, ALife models are not thought experiments – philosophical or 
scientific. Consider: If one maintains that ALife models are thought experiments 
because they provide insights into possible worlds (life as it could be and maybe is), 
rather than the actual world, one risks counting many well-known mathematical 
models from, say, theoretical biology (e.g. Grafen‟s 1990 handicap principle models) 
as thought experiments. And that is to lose a distinction (between mathematical 
models and thought experiments) which is worth having. This loss prevails even if 
one adds in Dennett‟s rider about possibility and necessity, or, in the case of 
simulations, Di Paolo et al.‟s (2000) neo-Kuhnian analysis that ALife models are 
thought experiments because they work by provoking a re-organisation of our 
concepts. Here is a way forward: On a no-nonsense account, a thought experiment is 
“a device that takes place in the imagination” (Brown 1997). Unlike other accounts, 
the no-nonsense account allows us to draw the line in the right place. Since neither 
ALife models nor mathematical models are (in the relevant sense) realised in the 
imagination, they are not thought experiments. So we end up with thought 
experiments on one side of the line, and ALife models and biological mathematical 
models on the other. 
 
This suggests a better account of ALife models, or of ALife simulations at 
least. These are best conceived as close relations of biological mathematical models 
(cf. Sterelny‟s 1997 conclusion that ALife simulations are representations of 
biological processes). They are useful relations: they allow us to drop some of the 
unrealistic assumptions which mathematical models often make for reasons of 
mathematics rather than biology (e.g. random mating, infinite populations). But they 
are relations, nonetheless. That, I think, is the right thing for philosophers to see. 
 
 
3. The View from Biology 
 
3.1 Seth Bullock 
 
Could ALife simulation modelling be a lingua franca between theoretical and 
empirical biology?  
 
Within the ALife community, computer simulations are being designed and 
built such that their ongoing dynamic behaviour reflects that of natural processes as 
they unfold over time.  Through exploring how these simulation models behave, and 
how this behaviour changes as their parameters, initial conditions, etc. are varied, 
modellers hope to learn more about (our theories of) the natural processes that these 
computer simulations were modelled upon.  If ALife simulations are to play this kind 
of scientific role successfully, if they are to serve as useful scientific models, it is 
important that (i) they meet the same methodological standards as models from more 
 5 
orthodox modelling paradigms and (ii) they offer something beyond and possibly 
above these existing modelling approaches. 
 
These twin concerns motivate the majority of writing on ALife modelling 
methodology (Bonabeau and Theraulaz 1994; Taylor and Jefferson 1994; Miller 
1995; Bullock 2000; Di Paolo et al. 2000). When is ALife simulation appropriate?  
What are its strengths and weaknesses?  How can ALife simulation models be 
verified, calibrated, assessed and employed to best effect?  How realistic should an 
ALife model be?  In what senses are they superior to formal mathematical models?  In 
what senses are they inferior?  How can we improve their rigour and their ability to 
interface with existing modelling traditions? 
 
In my opinion these debates are necessary and important if ALife simulation 
modelling is to engage successfully with mainstream science. However, I believe that 
in concentrating on issues of methodological rigour and in identifying the benefits of 
simulation models with their ability to augment, extend, or challenge existing 
modelling paradigms, an important potential role for these models is being neglected. 
 
Over the last few decades, theoretical biologists have made important inroads 
into modelling what were often previously pretty informal evolutionary and 
ecological ideas.  However, these models tend to be couched in terms of formulae, 
calculus, game theory, etc. While empirical biologists in the field and laboratory 
appreciate that these models are crucially important to ecology and evolutionary 
biology, many have little inclination to digest the maths.  This appears to be leading to 
an increasing divide between the theoretical and empirical camps. Field biology, 
theoretical modelling and experimentation were once carried out by the same 
individuals. However, as with most modern science, it is now the norm to find greater 
specialisation.  As has been pointed out (Ortega y Gasset 1930) these increases in 
specialisation often take place at the expense of genuine dialogue between specialists. 
 
Against the backdrop provided by this crude caricature of modern biology, 
ALife simulations seem extraordinarily well-positioned to provide a modelling 
vocabulary capable of supporting genuine communication between theoretical and 
empirical biologists. Individual- or agent-based simulation models resemble the 
process models that biologists make use of in their informal discussions of animal 
behaviour.  As such these simulation models have an immediacy that their formal 
cousins lack. When successful, these same simulations also capture the formal 
relationships that drive theoretical biological models.  In order to maximise the ability 
of ALife simulation models to serve the purposes of the whole biology community, 
these models must meet the formal criteria of rigour, etc. demanded of them by the 
theoretical biology community, but they must also meet the pedagogical criteria of 
transparency, clarity, appropriateness, straightforwardness, etc. demanded by the 
more general biology community. The ALife methodology debate has tended to focus 
on the former aspect while downplaying the latter. 
 
There are few ALife papers introducing ways of better conveying the structure 
of a simulation model on paper, or techniques for effectively visualising the often 
high-dimensional data sets that simulations produce.  In addition, there is little explicit 
work on combatting the downside of a simulation model's immediacy – the tendency 
of some audiences to “project” added reality onto a simple simulation, mistakenly 
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understanding the superficial similarity between simulated agents and real organisms 
as the point of a model, for instance. 
 
Both experimental and formal math modelling paradigms have gradually 
developed well-understood orthodox presentation methods that effectively encourage 
clarity, brevity, etc. By contrast, there simply has not been enough time for equivalent 
practices to arise and fixate within the simulation modelling community.  While it is 
likely that, given time, an orthodoxy will develop organically, this process can be 
hastened by research into the pedagogy of simulation modelling. In my opinion this 
work should be explicitly encouraged if ALife simulation modelling is to fulfil its 
potential as a modelling practice that is both completely rigorous and maximally 
luminous. 
 
3.2 Anil Seth 
 
Can simulation models of an ALife flavour successfully mediate between theoretical 
and empirical biology?  The recent history of ecological modelling suggests, 
cautiously, that they can.  For more than a decade ecologists have debated the merits 
of „individual-based‟ models (IBMs), which “treat individuals as unique and discrete 
entities which have at least one property … that changes during the life cycle” 
(Grimm 1999, p.130), over those of more traditional „state-variable‟ models (SVMs), 
which utilise population averages. Early propaganda emphasised that IBMs, like 
many ALife models, can accommodate individual and local interactions forever 
beyond the ken of SVMs and critical in accounting for a wealth of empirical data 
(Huston et al. 1988). It was even hoped that IBMs might thus „unify‟ ecology, 
offering up general principles of ecological systems in place of contingent „rules of 
thumb‟ (Judson 1994). 
 
Ten years later, in a sobering review,  Grimm (1999) identified a number of 
difficulties with this vision, many of which also found voice in the present workshop 
in the context of ALife.  To give a taste:  IBMs are hard to develop, hard to 
communicate (see section 3.1 above), and hard to understand.  The abundance of free 
parameters runs the risk of „WYWIWYG‟ (what-you-want-is-what-you-get).  The 
flood of data produced by IBMs is hard to analyse, and the role of statistics unclear.  
Perhaps most significant of all, Grimm argued that IBMs must make greater reference 
to the concepts of population ecology inherited from SVMs, such as „stability‟ and 
„persistence‟, if they are to successfully mediate theory and experiment. 
 
It is not hard to see in this history a parallel with the development of ALife, 
from an early idealism to recent concerns over methodology and interaction with 
empirical data. The concerns of Grimm are therefore to be duly noted, but a question 
arises: what conceptual framework should ALife make reference to?  Perhaps, rather 
than accepting with Grimm a framework as given, ALife models by their flexibility 
can encourage a dialectic between alternative theoretical perspectives.  Whereas 
ecological IBMs have focussed almost exclusively on the consequences of individual 
variation, ALife models can and regularly do incorporate many other aspects of agent-
environment interaction. For example, by modelling individual rate-maximising 
behaviour, insights and ideas from population ecology and optimal foraging theory 
can encounter each other, and – more generally – the much criticised gulf between 
IBMs and optimality modelling can be reduced (Seth 2000).  Situated perception and 
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action and/or spatially structured environments also suggest themselves as means by 
which ALife models may challenge the utility of (whilst continuing to make reference 
to) theoretical entities derived from „higher‟ levels of description (see, for example, 
Seth 2001). 
 
The optimistic view, then, is that ALife models can not only mediate theory 
and experiment, but also encourage theoretical evolution and hence increasingly 
effective mediation in the future. What is required: close targeting of ALife models to 
specific empirical and conceptual issues, and a healthy appreciation of the many 
pitfalls involved. 
 
4.  The View From Linguistics 
 
4.1 Jason Noble 
 
What has work in ALife told us about language?  If we look at the early proceedings 
volumes for the International and European Conferences on ALife, language and 
communication was a hot topic.  There was great enthusiasm for ALife models that 
were going to tell us about the selective pressures that lead to simple signalling 
systems in animals, and about how language could have developed from one such 
simple system.  Although there has arguably been some progress on the first of these 
issues, ALife has failed to give much insight into the second. 
 
Most ALife work advertised as being relevant to the evolution of language or 
communication is really about the evolution of coherent two-way mappings between 
meanings, signals, and meanings again.  That is, speakers must evolve a mapping 
between private meanings and public signals, and hearers must evolve a 
complementary mapping such that private meanings can be recovered, more or less 
reliably, from public signals (see, e.g., MacLennan 1992; Steels and Vogt 1997).  The 
fact that under the right circumstances such mappings can arise has now been safely 
established. 
 
Have such findings in ALife been picked up on by linguistics?  The short 
answer is no.  An examination of recent „Introduction to Linguistics‟ courses and 
textbooks shows that ALife does not register on the radar.  This is not surprising, as 
the two fields have different goals.  Linguistics is concerned with the empirical 
investigation of a well-defined, concrete phenomenon: human language.  ALife, on 
the other hand, attempts to cast light on the origins of complexity, by modelling such 
processes as the origin of life, or the cell, or cognition, or sociality, or indeed 
language.  Whereas the average linguist might examine many languages for evidence 
of a proposed universal, or study the way children acquire language, he or she would 
be unlikely to speculate too much about the evolutionary origins of the language 
faculty. Chomsky's well-known reticence on this point has been as influential as his 
positive contributions to the discipline (Chomsky 1987). 
 
Thus, most linguists have taken the existence of meaning-signal-meaning 
mappings as a given, and ALife work showing the evolution of such mappings was 
never likely to catch their imagination.  Some ALife research has tackled the more 
difficult question of syntactic communication – an area that would certainly be more 
relevant to the interests of modern linguists – but this work has usually failed to get 
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far.  Partly this is because explaining the evolution of syntax is a very hard problem.  
However, as often happens in ALife, another problem has been that skills in 
computational modelling are not combined with adequate knowledge in the 
application domain.  An exception to this rule is the Language Evolution and 
Computation (LEC) group, based in Edinburgh.  This group of linguists and computer 
scientists stands out as doing ALife work that is likely to be of interest to the 
mainstream linguistics world, e.g., Kirby and Hurford's (1997) paper on how 
glossogenetic evolution reduces the theoretical demands on any hypothesized 
language acquisition device. 
 
The work of the LEC group is often presented at the „Evolution of Language‟ 
conference series.  Although these conferences are not exactly mainstream linguistics, 
there should definitely be room for more contact between ALife researchers and this 
community, as both groups are interested in the adaptive function and origins of 
language.  There is some risk of the blind leading the blind, in that many of the 
theories proposed by evolution-of-language theorists such as Bickerton (1998), 
Dunbar (1996), and Deacon (1997) are not specified in enough detail to support good 
model building.  This can be contrasted with, for example, behavioural ecology, 
where theories on the evolution of signalling are well-developed enough for a useful 
simulation to be constructed.  It follows that a practical goal for ALife researchers 
would be to work with the evolution-of-language community to devise more specific 
theories and to explore them in ALife simulations. 
 
4.2 Simon Kirby 
 
Initially it might seem inappropriate to apply ALife techniques to linguistics. After all, 
it seems that by its very name ALife is concerned with exploring phenomena that are 
intimately related to life. Linguistics, on the other hand, takes as its object of study the 
peculiar system of communication that is specific to humans. Nevertheless, an 
increasing number of papers are being presented at ALife conferences and appearing 
in ALife journals that tackle issues that overlap (at least) with those that linguists are 
interested in (e.g. Steels 1997). 
 
Why are ALife techniques appropriate for the linguist? The answer to this 
question lies in an understanding of some of the primary concerns of linguistics, and 
the unusual complexity of the dynamic systems that under-pin language. 
Fundamentally, modern explanatory linguistics is concerned with answering the 
following two questions: 
 
1. Why is language the way it is and not some other way?  
2. How did language arise out of non-language? 
 
We can think of these questions in terms of the set of logically possible 
communication systems C. Linguistics is concerned with the set of possible human 
languages, LPH ⊂ C. The two questions above are essentially about explaining the 
particular properties of the shape of LPH and showing how this set came to be from 
some prior (unknown) set LPH' (Kirby 1999). Before any of this is possible, there is 
also a non-trivial descriptive task of determining LPH. Thankfully, there is an 
enormous amount of excellent descriptive work in the linguistics literature that covers 
all aspects of language, from research into the syntax of individual languages – both 
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synchronic (Napoli 1993) and diachronic (McMahon 1994) – to large scale cross-
linguistic studies that look at the distribution of features of languages in very large 
samples (Croft 1990). 
 
What possible approaches are there to tackling these why and how questions? 
An influential perspective has been the synthesis of Chomskyan approaches to 
explanation on the one hand, and evolutionary psychology on the other: 
 
1. Why? LPH is determined directly by our biological makeup. In 
particular, we have an innate language acquisition device, LAD, 
that constrains us to learn a LLAD ≡ LPH (Chomsky 1987). 
 
2. How? LLAD is also the set of languages that are functional as 
communicative systems for the human species. The LAD, like any 
other complex functional biological structure, evolved through a 
process of natural selection (Pinker and Bloom 1990). 
 
Already, we can see why ALife techniques might be useful to check the claims 
of explanatory linguistics. After all, in its short history, ALife has regularly tackled 
issues such as: communication, learning, and biological adaptation. However, the case 
for ALife as an approach has become stronger in recent years as a number of authors 
have suggested that the evolved-learner approach understates the complexity of 
language in a fundamental way (Batali 1998; Kirby 2000). In the Chomskyan 
framework, the key to answering the why question is the idealisation that LLAD ≡ LPH. 
However, this can only be true under conditions where the data to the learner are 
drawn from a single stationary target language, and all languages in LLAD are equally 
learnable. The extensive literature on language development (MacWhinney 1999), 
computational models of learning, and socio-linguistics (Trudgill 1995) show this is 
not the case. This matters because it means there is a new dynamic to consider in 
addition to learning and evolution: culture. 
 
We can think of this problem as one involving a cycle of three adaptive 
systems. Learning involves the adaptation, within the lifetime of an individual, of 
internal representations to the utterances presented to the child. Languages adapt to 
the biases inherent in the learning mechanism over a historical time-scale. The innate 
specification of learning biases adapts on a biological time-scale in order to make the 
languages that emerge from the cultural process learnable by children. 
 
To determine whether this tangled hierarchy of adaptation can answer the why 
and how questions, linguistics may well need ALife. This is the “weak” ALife 
position: that language can be modelled using ALife. Conversely, there is a “strong” 
position too. It might eventually prove interesting to consider language itself as alive 
(a non-obligate symbiont; Christiansen 1994), and that it could be possible to create a 
genuine language in silico (Steels 2001). 
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5. The View from History: Cybernetics 
 
5.1 Philip Husbands 
 
From September 1949 to July 1953 a select dining club met regularly to discuss ideas 
and issues relating to cybernetics. The Ratio Club, as the group became known after 
the second meeting, usually gathered in a room in the National Hospital, London, 
where, after a meal and drinks, participants “… would turn in their easy chairs 
towards a blackboard where someone would open a discussion …” (Bates 1949). The 
club was founded and organized by John Bates, a physiologist at the National 
Hospital. The other twenty carefully selected members were a mixed group of mainly 
young physiologists, engineers and mathematicians. Only “those who had Wiener‟s 
ideas before Wiener‟s [1948] book appeared” (Bates 1949) qualified for membership. 
In order to avoid restricting  open discussion, no one of professorial rank could join 
and if any members should be promoted to that level, a club rule stated that they must 
resign (Bates, unpublished papers). There are two things that  make the club truly 
extraordinary from an historical perspective. The first  is the fact that many of its 
members went on to become extremely prominent scientists. The second is the 
important influence that the club meetings, particularly the earlier ones, had on  the 
development of the scientific contributions many of that remarkable group would later 
make.  
 
Space restrictions preclude a full description of  the achievements of the whole group. 
Instead, very brief outlines of those of a somewhat arbitrarily chosen subset are given 
below. 
 
Alan Turing is universally regarded as one of the fathers of both computer 
science and artificial intelligence (AI). He also anticipated some of the central ideas 
and methodologies of ALife and Nouvelle AI by half a century – for instance, he 
proposed artificial evolutionary approaches to AI in 1950 (Turing 1950) and 
published work on reaction-diffusion models of the chemical origins of biological 
form in 1952 (Turing 1952). Horace Barlow is an enormously influential 
neuroscientist, particularly in the field of vision, and was one of the pioneers of using 
information-theoretic ideas to understand neural mechanisms (Barlow 1953, 1972, 
1989). Grey Walter made crucial contributions to the technology of EEG recordings, 
to ideas in pattern recognition, and of course built his autonomous turtles to study 
mechanisms underlying the generation of adaptive behaviour (Walter 1950). W. Ross 
Ashby formulated theoretical frameworks for understanding adaptive behaviour 
which are experiencing something of a renaissance in ALife and modern AI (Ashby 
1952, 1958). Among many other achievements in a variety of scientific fields, 
Thomas Gold was a co-author of the steady-state theory of the universe and founded 
the Cornell Astrophysics department. Jack Good became a very prominent 
statistician making important contributions in Bayesian methods. Eliot Slater became 
an influential  psychologist, while  Albert Uttley and  Donald Mackay were, among 
many other things, artificial neural network and machine learning pioneers (Uttley 
1959, Mackay 1956). D.A. Sholl  did classic work on neuron morphologies and P. 
Merton made very important contributions to single neuron recording techniques and 
servo theories of muscular control. 
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Club meetings were typically informal affairs with one or two presentations 
followed by open and lively discussion. Topics ranged from members educating their 
colleagues on the latest ideas in e.g. probability theory or information theory, to 
debates on the scientific status of telepathy. However, most meetings centred around 
one of the research pre-occupations of that night‟s main speaker. Meetings included: 
Ashby on statistical machinery; Turing on educating a digital computer; Walter on 
adaptive behaviour; Uttley, Mackay and Barlow on pattern recognition; Turing on 
morphogenesis; and Merton on the servo control of muscular movements (Bates, 
unpublished papers). 
 
The Ratio Club was a very fruitful interdisciplinary activity resulting in the 
highly productive movement of tools and ideas across traditional discipline 
boundaries, influencing the subsequent scientific trajectories of many members 
(Barlow, personal communication). A high proportion of the group had previously 
known each other at Cambridge University and most had been involved in war-time 
scientific work which forced them to think about issues, e.g. in gun control or code 
cracking, that would not normally have engaged them. This seems to have led to a 
strong desire to explore interdisciplinary approaches, as many had begun to see their 
potential during this war-time work. However, the vast majority of members still saw 
themselves as primarily physiologists or engineers or mathematicians or physicists. 
With the possible exception of Ashby, there does not appear to have been any 
significant will to start a movement or forge a new academic discipline. Of course, 
strong arguments can be made for the view that new disciplines, such as control 
theory, computer science and AI, did later emerge from the kind of work that  many 
members, such as Mackay, Turing and Uttley, pursued. But this was not the 
underlying motivation of the Ratio Club. 
 
It is worth reflecting today on whether ALife is, or should be, an identifiable 
discipline or a loose support structure to encourage interdisciplinary collaborations 
and exchanges. We should avoid the unfortunate image some biologists had a few 
years ago of ALife researchers: that of a group of meddlers  regarding themselves as a 
crack team of scientific trouble shooters, armed only with lap-top computers and 
naïve enthusiasm, ready to solve the fundamental problems of biology before moving 
on to the next mission. The most fruitful roles, both scientifically and strategically, 
will mostly be cross-discipline collaborations and the absorption of tools and 
methodologies into existing disciplines where they can be used from a position of 
authority – just as it was half a century ago. 
 
5.2  Ezequiel Di Paolo 
 
Whilst those involved in the Ratio Club found little reason to consider themselves as 
spearheading the development of a novel discipline, parallel currents in the American 
scene sought the definition of a new interdisciplinary identity. The cybernetic 
movement developed through a series of meetings from 1946 to 1953 bringing 
together engineers, mathematicians, neuroscientists, psychologists, and social 
scientists. Well-known for its contributions to the development of control theory, 
communication engineering, and operations research, cybernetics was short-lived as a 
movement, giving rise to the offspring disciplines of AI and cognitive science (as well 
as the less conspicuous second-order cybernetics). This genealogical relation is well 
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argued for by Dupuy's study of the history of ideas leading to the sciences of 
cognition in the second half of the twentieth century (Dupuy 2000). 
 
In the current context, it is interesting to mention the relation of cybernetics to 
other relevant disciplines also preoccupied with the study of the brain and the mind. 
Cybernetics' main tenet was that the mind was a manifestation of physics and was 
susceptible to being studied by the methods of physics. Against the backdrop of the 
logical revolution of the 1930s, the brain was conceived as a logical machine. The key 
model embodying these ideas was McCulloch and Pitts' (1943) idealisation of neural 
circuits in which neurons played the role of digital gates. The idea saw little support 
from neurophysiologists and Gestalt psychologists, mainly because its reductive 
atomism was not justified empirically. Further  developments of the model served 
only partially to respond to these criticisms. Cyberneticians were accused of 
infatuation with their own creations. The very concept of a model started to reveal the 
ambiguity in the everyday use of the word: a model as the imitation of something else, 
a model as something to be imitated. Models turned into legitimate objects of study – 
goals  rather than means. This ambiguity, and its pitfalls, did not disappear with AI or 
with ALife. However, it never caught on so strongly in other disciplines. Models in 
science are mostly seen as tools for understanding – they are limited in scope, austere, 
and pragmatic. It is here that ALife mostly resembles its ancestors, in the confusion 
between simulations and instantiations; and it is here that it must tread most carefully 
if it is not to repeat the mistakes of the past. 
 
Non-parallels also must be noticed. Cybernetics contributed key concepts to 
other fields, whereas ALife is, for the moment, most likely to contribute innovative 
methods such as evolutionary simulation modelling. The technical power behind 
cybernetics is dwarfed by today's computing resources. Cybernetics was the meeting 
point of researchers trained in very different disciplines. Although, to a limited extent, 
this last point is also true of ALife, the overwhelming majority of ALife practitioners 
can claim a background in, or an affiliation with, computer science. 
 
Which model should ALife follow? A flag of convenience as the Ratio Club? 
A banner for the fruitful exploration of ideas?  Or, as early cybernetics, a discipline 
meant to do the job of other disciplines, only with a different, more abstract approach? 
If the second alternative is chosen, then we must seriously contemplate its difficulties, 
and we must take a close look at cybernetics and its failure at engaging in a 
productive dialogue with relevant fields. Collaborations with willing biologists may 
be the way forward to resolve these problems, but where does this leave the identity 
of the  discipline? Overall, the flag of convenience alternative looks more realistic and 
possibly more productive. ALife may turn out to be short-lived and badly 
remembered, but it can aspire to have provided the space for the development of 
methods and ideas that, at least during our time, may have been hard to develop 
anywhere else. The job done, the results should be reaped by other disciplines. As of 
now, it is not even clear which model ALife is trying to follow. Clarifying this 
question is the next logical step. 
 
6. Reactions 
 
Once targeted explicitly by the cybernetics speakers, questions concerning the status 
and the future of ALife as a discipline (which in truth had been bubbling away just 
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under the surface ever since the philosophy session) became the principal focus of the 
workshop. During the final, open discussion session, many participants (perhaps 
surprisingly) endorsed versions of the view that ALife is not a unified intellectual 
endeavour with a well-defined explanatory space all of its own. Rather, ALife is 
(something like) a liberating intellectual environment, an academic context within 
which new or under-explored techniques and ideas for exploring the phenomena of 
life can be clarified and developed. Often, these are techniques and ideas which are 
marginalised within the more traditional life-related disciplines such as biology, 
neuroscience, or AI.  
 
On the basis of this kind of assessment, some participants drew the following, 
radical conclusions: (a) ALife enjoys a rather precarious position as a scientific 
endeavour; (b) ALife should use the intellectual freedom provided by the field to 
refine its techniques and ideas, at which point the appropriate thing to do would be to 
dissolve into the more traditional disciplines (biology, neuroscience, AI, linguistics, 
economics, philosophy etc.). It should be noted, however, that this critical re-thinking 
of the place of ALife on the scientific map was not universally accepted. For example, 
Bedau, in his presentation (see section 2.1 above), had already argued that ALife can 
enable other disciplines to pursue new research directions. In debate, other dissenters 
argued that the integrity of ALife as a discipline flows precisely from, and crucially 
will be maintained by, the fact that it has developed, and (one hopes) will continue to 
develop, new investigative and explanatory tools that are potentially of use to other 
disciplines. Yet other participants argued that the integrity of ALife may be secured 
by the strong ALife programme, which claims not merely to study, in distinctive 
ways, life-related phenomena that are already within the explanatory remits of other 
disciplines, but also to create novel phenomena of life. Of course, one will be tempted 
by this final position only if one endorses strong ALife.  
 
Despite these clear differences of opinion, most participants in the debates 
agreed that cross-disciplinary interactions, and better still joint initiatives between 
ALifers and researchers from adjacent disciplines, are likely to represent the most 
promising strategies for ALifers to adopt. The discussion undoubtedly fostered an 
increased  sensitivity to the necessity of cross-disciplinary work, and to the massive 
opportunities that it presents, but also to the problems that it faces. In particular, it was 
noted that such work is neither easy to launch nor easy to sustain, given the 
undermining effects of conceptual misunderstandings, clashes of practice, and 
unhelpful institutional divisions between disciplines. Thus the existence of genuinely 
cross-disciplinary collaboration, let alone its success, is far from inevitable.  
 
Although the status and the likely future of ALife was the issue that 
commanded most of the discussion time, it was certainly not the only matter placed 
under the spotlight. For example, the question of whether or not it is correct and/or 
useful to interpret ALife models as thought experiments was pursued in the discussion 
period of the philosophy session, and clearly remains an open question of some 
importance to the community. Similarly, Bullock‟s claim that ALife needs well-
understood, orthodox presentation methods that encourage clarity and understanding 
was taken up at some length in the biology session. Of course, these more specific 
issues are far from orthogonal to what we have isolated as the dominant theme. Space 
prevents us from mentioning a number of other such questions which were explored.  
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We believe that the „View from Elsewhere‟ workshop was a notable success in 
providing a platform and some direction for important debates which will no doubt be 
continued in new forms and new contexts at future ALife conferences. We hope that 
this paper is not only a faithful record many of the ideas that were expressed in Prague 
on 9
th
 September 2001, but also a point of departure for those future deliberations and 
disputes. Next stop: ALife VIII.   
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